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COMMONWEALTH v. MAGUIRE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Commonwealth v. Maguire,l the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts held that MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 233, section 2P 
gave a trial court reviewable discretion to exclude or admit evidence of 
prior convictions intended to impeach a criminal defendant on the 
stand.3 The court, in expressly overruling Commonwealth v. West,4 
.which held that trial courts have no discretion concerning the admis­
sion of prior convictions under chapter 233, section 21,s professed a 
concern about fairness to the defendant if the trial court were to lack 
reviewable discretion.6 The Maguire court agreed, therefore, to hear 
"seasonably raised challenges"7 to the trial court's discretion in admit­
ting prior convictions, testing the abuse of that discretion by weighing 
the probative value against the possibility of prejudice to the defend­
ant. 8 The court, however, applied the test deferentially to the case at 
bar,9 demonstrating that the seemingly broad rule created in the case 
is likely to be limited in its application. \0 
Lawrence Maguire, the defendant, was tried on charges of aggra­
vated rape of one woman and assault with intent to rape another.ll 
1. 392 Mass. 466, 467 N.E.2d 112 (1984). 
2. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 21 (West 1959 & Supp. 1984) reads in part: 
''The conviction of a witness of a crime may be shown to affect his credibility." Id. (empha­
sis added). 
3. 392 Mass. at 470, 467 N.E.2d at 115. 
4. 357 Mass. 245, 258 N.E.2d 22 (1970). 
5. Id. at 249, 258 N.E.2d at 24. 
6. Maguire, 392 Mass. at 469-70, 467 N.E.2d at 114-15. 
7. Id. at 470, 467 N.E.2d at 115. 
8. Id. The inquiry focuses on abuse of discretion. The balancing test is the same test 
a trial court should use before it admits the convictions. See Maguire, 392 Mass. at 469, 
467 N.E.2d at 114-15. 
9. Maguire, 392 Mass. at 470-71,467 N.E.2d at 115-16. See infra notes 73-75 and 
accompanying text. 
10. "Limited" refers to the actual exclusion of prior convictions at the trial level. 
Most convictions will probably be admissible under the rule to impeach the defendant and 
very few will be considered prejudicial so long as the trial court uses limiting instructions to 
.reduce the impact. See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text; see also Spencer v. Texas, 
385 U,s. 554, 561 (1967). But see Commonwealth v. DiMarzo, 364 Mass. 669,681, 308 
N.E.2d 538, 546 (1974) (Hennessey, J.,concurring) (effectiveness of limiting instructions 
used to avert prejudice questionable). 
11. Maguire, 392 Mass. at 467, 467 N.E.2d at 113. The defendant was also indicted 
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When he testified in his defense, the prosecution impeached him with 
evidence of a prior sex-related conviction. 12 The defendant moved to 
exclude the evidence l3 but the trial court denied the motion. 14 The 
trial judge did, however, give two separate limiting instructions to the 
jury about the conviction. 1s After a long trial and four days of deliber­
ation, the jury found Maguire guilty on all charges. 16 
The defendant appealed, presenting two significant questions to 
the supreme judicial court: (1) is a trial court's discretion to admit or 
exclude prior convictions, described as a non-reviewable right in Com­
monwealth v. Diaz,17 reviewable by an appellate court;18 and (2) if so, 
what standard of review should be applied?19 The court also con­
fronted another issue that the defendant's appeal had not raised: Does 
a trial court in Massachusetts have the discretion to exclude prior 
convictions?20 
II. THE DECISION 
The court began its opinion by addressing the latter unspoken 
question. Although the issue of whether the trial court has discretion 
when prior convictions are involved was arguably settled by the hold­
ings in Commonwealth v. Chase 21 and Commonwealth v. Diaz,22 the 
on related charges of assault and battery during the aggravated rape and of breaking and 
entering during the attempted rape. Id. at 467 n.l, 467 N.E.2d at 113 n.1. 
12. Id. at 467, 467 N.E.2d at 113. The prior conviction was under MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 16 (West 1970), for open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior 
in front of four women. The defendant paid a fine of $250 upon conviction. Maguire, 392 
Mass. at 467, 471, 467 N.E.2d at 113, 115. 
13. Maguire, 392 Mass. at 470-71, 467 N.E.2d at 115. The motion was made in 
limine and denied by the trial court before the defendant testified. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 467, 467 N.E.2d at 113. The trial court instructed the jury that the convic­
tion was introduced and admitted solely on the issue of the defendant's credibility both 
immediately after it admitted the evidence and again when it gave the charge. Id. 
16. Id at 466-67, 467 N.E.2d at 113. 
17. 383 Mass. 73, 80, 417 N.E.2d 950, 955 (1981). 
18. See Maguire, 392 Mass. at 467, 467 N.E.2d at 113. 
19. See id. at 470, 467 N.E.2d at 115. The defendant also argued that the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying a jury request for a transcript of the testimony of one 
witness and in excluding a report written by the same witness. Id. The Maguire court 
found no merit in the defendant's contentions, dismissing the trial court rulings as straight­
forward evidence rulings at the end of the opinion. Id. at 472-73,467 N.E.2d at 116-17. 
20. Prior opinions interpreting the rule set out in chapter 233, section 21 never actu­
ally addressed the question. Before Maguire, the supreme judicial court avoided reinter­
preting chapter 233, section 21 by terming the discretionary authority as a "right" to 
exclude prior convictions. See infra text accompanying notes 23-29. 
21. 372 Mass. 736, 363 N.E.2d 1105 (1977). 
22. 383 Mass. 73,417 N.E.2d 950 (1981). 
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court felt the need to address it in light of West's holding that the 
language in chapter 233, section 21 referred to the admission of prior 
convictions as an option of the cross-examining party, not as a matter 
of trial court discretion.23 The Chase court had held that West still 
applied to most situations,24 but had also stated that the trial court 
possessed a "right" to exclude evidence of prior convictions if the like­
lihood of intense prejudice to the defendant due to the convictions cre­
ated a question of unfairness. 25 The Diaz court expanded on the Chase 
position, casting the "right" in terms of an absolute, nonreviewable 
decision by the trial court.26 A more recent case, Commonwealth v. 
Knight,27 baldly stated that "judges now have discretion to preclude 
the use of prior convictions to impeach a defendant's credibility."28 
Although all these decisions seem to contradict West, their holdings 
created an exception to the West rule instead of overruling it. 29 
Perhaps recognizing the anomaly in its prior decisions, the 
supreme judicial court in Maguire launched into a justification of giv­
ing trial courts discretionary authority to exclude prior convictions as 
evidence for impeachment uses30 before reaching the merits of the 
case. Pointing out that most states adhere to Federal Rule of Evidence 
23. West, 357 Mass. at 249, 258 N.E.2d at 24. The Maguire court effectively ad­
dressed the issue of trial court discretion first by laying out the West holding and then 
discrediting it with a subsequent discussion of the attractiveness of recognizing trial court 
discretionary authority to exclude prior convictions. Maguire, 392 Mass. at 467-69, 467 
N.E.2d at 113-15. The West court reasoned that because the defendant was a witness on 
the stand when he testified, he was as open to cross-examination and impeachment as any 
other witness. West, 357 Mass. at 249, 258 N.E.2d at 24. The West court then stated that 
the use of prior convictions was one of many options available to the cross-examining party 
for impeaching a witness. Id. The court, consequently, held that chapter 233, section 21 
referred to that option, not trial court discretion. Id. 
24. Chase, 372 Mass. at 749-50, 363 N.E.2d at 1114. 
25. Id. at 750, 363 N.E.2d at 1114-15. 
26. Diaz, 383 Mass. at 80, 417 N.E.2d at 955. 
27. 392 Mass. 192,465 N.E.2d 771 (1984). 
28. Id. at 194,465 N.E.2d at 773. 
29. The Chase court discussed West as a general rule to follow, claiming that the only 
exception to it was when the likelihood of prejudice was intense. Chase, 372 Mass. at 749­
50,363 N.E.2d at 1114-15. Specifically, the court stated: "[W]e would not deny the right 
of a judge to avoid any question of unfairness by excluding [prior convictions] where the 
likely prejudice to the defendant is most intense." Id. at 750,363 N.E.2d at 1114-15. Con­
stitutional concerns of due process seem to underlie the exception, although the Chase 
court did not feel they applied to the case at bar. Id. at 751, 363 N.E.2d at 1115. The Diaz 
court cited to West in passing, relying primarily on Chase for support. Diaz, 383 Mass. at 
80, 417 N.E.2d at 954. By the time Knight was decided, this example of the exception 
emasculating the rule was firmly entrenched in Massachusetts case law. See Common­
wealth v. King, 391 Mass. 691,463 N.E.2d 1168 (1984). 
30. Maguire, 392 Mass. at 468-69, 467 N.E.2d at 114. 
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609(a),31 the court concluded that previously it had effectively granted 
discretion to Massachusetts trial courts.32 The court noted with ap­
proval that trial court discretion avoided prejudice to the defendant 
either when the conviction and the charge were substantially similar33 
or when the prior conviction did not affect untruthfulness. 34 The 
court also observed that trial court discretion aided the fact-finder by 
encouraging the defendant to testify.35 The Maguire court then ad­
dressed the issues raised in the defendant's appeal. Although the court 
did not find constitutional problems with a lack of appellate review of 
discretion to admit prior convictions,36 its concern with fairness to the 
defendant led it to overrule West expressly37 and to reinterpret the 
language of chapter 233, section 21 to allow the trial court reviewable 
discretion.38 The court then established a standard for review that fo­
cused on balancing the probative value of the prior conviction against 
the likelihood of unfair prejUdice to the defendant.39 
Applying its standard to the facts before it, the court found no 
abuse of discretion.4O It held that the trial court averted prejudice to 
31. Id. at 468 & nn.2-6, 467 N.E.2d at 114 & nn.2-6. The court noted that most 
states have adopted a position similar to Rule 609(a), granting the trial court discretion in 
admitting prior convictions either by statute, by rule, or by court decision. Id. at 468-69, 
467 N.E.2d at 114. Footnotes 2 through 6 on the cited pages of the decision provide an 
extensive list of cases, statutes, and rules in which the adoption of Rule 609(a) can be found 
and portray the method by which the rule was incorporated into state law. See Maguire, 
392 Mass. at 468 & nn.2-6, 467 N.E.2d at 114 & nn.2-6. See also 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. 
BERGER, EVIDENCE 1) 609[12], at 609-109 to 609-137 (1982 & Supp. 1984). 
32. Maguire, 392 Mass. at 469, 467 N.E.2d at 114. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 469, 467 N.E.2d at 115. 
36. Id. at 470,467 N.E.2d at 115. The primary authority for the lack of concern lies 
in Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967). In Spencer, the United States Supreme Court 
considered a due process challenge to the use of prior convictions for impeachment of a 
defendant in a murder case under a Texas statute authorizing the use of the convictions. 
The Spencer court held that, because of the legitimate state purpose in using prior convic­
tions for impeachment and the guard against prejudice through the use of limiting instruc­
tions, no due process problem existed. Spencer, 385 U.S. at 561. Although the Spencer 
court also discussed discretion of the trial court as a factor in averting prejUdice, id., this 
has been dismissed as dicta in federal court interpretations of Spencer. See United States v. 
Belt, 514 F.2d 837, 848-50 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Dixon v. United States, 287 A.2d 89, 94 (D.C. 
Ct. App. 1972), cert. denied 407 U.S. 926 (1972). See also Leno v. Gaughan, 664 F.2d 314, 
315 (1st Cir. 1981) (per curiam). 
37. Maguire, 392 Mass. at 469-70, 467 N.E.2d at 114-15. "Fairness" has been an 
overriding concern in other prior Massachusetts cases as well. See Commonwealth v. 
Chase, 372 Mass. 736, 750, 363 N.E.2d 1105, 1114-15 (1977); Commonwealth v. DiMarzo, 
364 Mass. 669, 678, 308 N.E.2d 538, 544 (1974) (Hennessey, J., concurring). 
38. Maguire, 392 Mass. at 470, 467 N.E.2d at 115. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 470-71,467 N.E.2d at 115-16. 
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the defendant through the use of two limiting instructions41 and noted 
that the prosecutor did not misuse the conviction.42 The court also 
concluded that since the prior conviction was not the result of a seri­
ous offense43 and was a sex-related crime,44 it was not substantially 
similar to a serious, violence-related crime such as rape.45 Finding no 
abuse of discretion or substantial likelihood of unfair prejudice, the 
supreme judicial court affirmed the conviction.46 
III. ANALYSIS 
In creating the Maguire rule, the supreme judicial court brought 
Massachusetts into accord with a majority ofjurisdictions in the coun­
try.47 The court moved away from the position that the status of crim­
inal defendants did not entitle them to special protection from their 
prior convictions when they testify48 to the position that the right of 
defendants to a fair trial entitled them to trial court scrutiny of their 
prior convictions and perhaps appellate scrutiny as wel1.49 In essence, 
the latter position matches the one taken by Federal Rule of Evidence 
609(a) and states that adopted it. 50 In substance, however, the new 
Massachusetts rule differs significantly from Rule 609(a) and its 
progeny. 
The language in Rule 609(a) establishes more restrictive bounda­
ries than the rule announced in the Maguire opinion. Rule 609(a) de­
lineates a general rule that most convictions are admissible to impeach 
41. Id. at 470, 467 N.E.2d at 115. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 471, 467 N.E.2d at 116. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 473, 467 N.E.2d at 116-17. 
47. See id. at 468-69 & nn.2-6, 467 N.E.2d at 114 & nn.2-6. See also WEINSTEIN & 
BERGER, supra note 31, ~ 609[12], at 609-109 to 609-137. 
48. Commonwealth v. West, 357 Mass. 245,258 N.E.2d 22 (1970). 
49. Maguire, 392 Mass. at 466, 467 N.E.2d at 112. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Chase, 372 Mass. 736, 363 N.E.2d 1105 (1977). 
50. FED. R. EVID. 609(a) states in part: 
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has 
been convicted ofa crime shall be admitted ... only if the crime (1) was punish­
able by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which 
he was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting 
this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dis­
honesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment. 
[d. 
A federal court held the discretion under Rule 609 to be reviewable in United States v. 
Hendershot, 614 F.2d 648, 651 (9th Cir. 1980). For a list of states which have adopted or 
rejected the rule, see State Correlation Tables, [Finding Aids Volume] FED. R. EVID. 
SERVo (Callaghan 1979). 
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a witness. 51 The rule contains restrictions, however, that regulate per­
missible convictions52 and that also carve out an exception to the rule 
when a criminal defendant testifies. 53 First, the conviction must be 
either on a charge equivalent to a federal felony 54 or for a crime in­
volving dishonesty or untruthfulness. 55 No restrictions apply to the 
latter class of conviction because of its high probative value for im­
peachment. 56 The potential prejudice involved in the former class of 
conviction, however, especially when a criminal defendant takes the 
stand,57 led the committees involved in the Federal Rules to require 
that the trial court weigh the probative value of the conviction against 
its prejudicial effect before allowing it to be used against an accused. 58 
In contrast, the language in Maguire neither expressly limits the 
classes of convictions admissible nor does it limit the trial court's bal­
ancing process to a particular type of witness. Although the supreme 
judicial court noted that certain convictions-such as crimes substan­
tially similar to the charge59 and convictions which do not affect un­
truthfulness60-may create a likelihood of prejudice, in Maguire it left 
the determination of whether to admit convictions entirely to the dis­
cretion of the trial court.61 The only restrictions on the Maguire rule 
lie in the defendant's right to appeal the exercise of a trial court's dis­
cretion62 and in the express limitations contained in chapter 233, sec­
tion 21.63 
51. FED. R. EVID. 609(a). 
52. See id. 
53. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(I). 
54. Id. 
55. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2). 
56. See House, Senate, and Conference Committee Reports on FED. R. EVID. 609(a), 
Rules of Evidence, [Finding Aids Volume] FED. R. EVID. SERVo (Callaghan 1979). Rule 
609(a)(2) also allows the use of misdemeanor convictions involving untruthfulness or dis­
honesty. See id. 
57. See id. The reports can be read to narrow the exception to apply to only criminal 
defendants. Id. 
58. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(I); see House, Senate, and Conference Committee Reports 
on FED. R. EVID. 609(a), Rules of Evidence, [Finding Aids Volume] FED. R. EVID. SERVo 
(Callaghan 1979). Note that Rule 609(a)(I) requires that the prejudicial effect merely out­
weigh the probative value, not substantially outweigh it. Cf FED. R. EVID. 403. 
59. Maguire, 392 Mass. at 469, 467 N.E.2d at 115. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 470, 467 N.E.2d at 115. The court merely stated that discretion existed 
under chapter 233, section 21 and that it is reviewable, nothing more. Id. 
62. It should be pointed out that appellate review is also available to the defendant, if 
in superior court, as an interlocutory appeal under MASS. R. CRIM. PRO. 15(b)(2). To 
assure such an appeal, the motion to suppress the conviction must be in limine and be 
decided before the trial begins. See MASS. R. CRIM. PRO. 15(c). 
63. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 21 (West 1959 & Supp. 1984). In its intro­
333 1984] RECENT DECISION 
Arguably, the Maguire court reached a logical result when one 
recognizes that the rule operates under a statute the purpose of which 
is to allow the use of any conviction except those specifically ex­
cluded.64 The rule's lack of discernable boundaries, however, opens 
the door for applications that could not occur under Rule 609(a). 
Under Maguire, a trial court could conceivably allow the use of a mis­
demeanor conviction not involving untruthfulness or dishonesty to im­
peach a witness. At the other extreme, the trial court could exclude, 
in a trial for embezzlement, a prior embezzlement conviction on the 
grounds of "substantial similarity" to the charge. Furthermore, 
Maguire places most of this power of application in the hands of the 
trial judge, while Rule 609(a) restricts application in several areas. 
The Maguire rule is also dissimilar on its face to Massachusetts 
Proposed Rule of Evidence 609(a),65 rejected by the supreme judicial 
court in 1983.66 Like Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a), the proposed 
rule advanced a probative value-prejudicial effect test only when a 
criminal defendant was involved;67 it did not, however, place limits on 
admissible convictions.68 Maguire differs from both the proposed rule 
and the federal rule in that it neither commands nor restricts the use of 
a balancing test when the accused testifies. Although the court stated 
that a balancing test will be used on appeal to judge whether the trial 
court abused its discretion in admitting the conviction,69 it did not 
expressly require the trial court to use a balancing test whenever the 
accused's prior convictions are offered to impeach him. Moreover, the 
ductory paragraph the statute states that as a general rule convictions may be admitted to 
impeach the credibility of a witness; it then lists specific exceptions. The exceptions include 
time limitations on the period a conviction may be used after it goes on record (misde­
meanor-five years; felony-ten years), and an exclusion of traffic violations for which only 
a fine was imposed. Id. 
64. Id. See supra note 63. 
65. MASS. PROP. R. EVID. 609(a) reads as follows: 
For the purpose of impeaching the credibility of a witness, evidence that he 
has been convicted of a crime is admissible. In a criminal case, the court shall 
have the discretion to exclude evidence of a prior conviction offered to impeach 
the credibility of the accused if it finds that its probative value is outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice. There shall be no discretion to exclude a prior 
conviction offered to impeach the credibility of any other witness. A plea of 
guilty or a finding or verdict of guilty shall constitute a conviction. 
Hughes, Evidence, 19 MASS. PRACfICE SERIES 376 (West Supp. 1981). 
66. See SJC Rejects Evidence Code, 11 MASS. LAW. WEEKLY 457 (1983). 
67. MASS. PROP. R. EVID. 609(a). 
68. Id. The drafters of the proposed rule saw the rule as a compromise between the 
need to protect an accused on the stand and the West court's interpretation of chapter 233, 
section 21. See Advisory Committee's Note to MASS. PROP. R. EVID. 609(a), in Hughes, 
Evidence, 19 MASS. PRACTICE SERIES 376-77 (West Supp. 1981). 
69. Maguire, 392 Mass. at 470, 467 N.E.2d at 115. 
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Maguire court did not limit the use of trial court discretion only to the 
accused. Theoretically, a trial court after Maguire could exclude any 
conviction offered to impeach any witness.7o In addition, only a de­
fendant witness would have the right to appeal the exercise of discre­
tion.1 1 The Maguire court, by changing the interpretation of one word 
in a statute, gave the trial court, in effect, more power than the drafters 
of both the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Massachusetts Pro­
posed Rules of Evidence were willing to give it.72 
Even when a criminal defendant is involved, the Maguire court's 
application of its rule indicated that great deference will be given to 
the trial court. In Maguire, the court was strongly inftuenced by the 
fact that the trial court gave two limiting instructions about the prior 
conviction.73 Its analysis of the relationship between the prior convic­
tion and the defendant's charge was superficial; the court failed to rec­
ognize that many people (and juries) still might equate rape with sex 
instead of violence.74 If the court were to give similar scrutiny to other 
defendants' appeals under the Maguire rule, "abuse of discretion" and. 
"substantial similarity"7S might develop into large hurdles. 
70. The theory arises from the fact that discretion under the statute exists without a 
qualification other than "witness." See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 21 (West 1959. 
& Supp. 1984). 
71. Maguire, 392 Mass. at 470, 467 N.E.2d at 115. "We will consider seasonably 
raised challenges to the admission of evidence of prior convictions of a defendant who 
testified at trial." /d. (emphasis added). In practice, the right of appeal will probably ex­
tend only to criminal defendants, since many of the concerns about misuse diminish sub­
stantially in a civil trial. 
72. Another aspect of FED. R. EVID. 609(a) which illustrates the difference in the 
discretionary power allocated to the trial court lies in the requirement that the trial court, 
when weighing the probative value against the prejudicial effect, must make a record of its 
findings and explicitly use the test in its ruling. See. e.g., United States v. Mahone, 537 
F.2d 922, 928-29 (7th Cir. 1976). Trial judges in Massachusetts might be wise to follow the 
procedure in order to ensure stability and protect their rulings. . 
73. Maguire, 392 Mass. at 470, 467 N.E.2d at 115. 
74. Id. at 471, 467 N.E.2d at 116. "Substantially similar" is in the eyes of the be­
holder. The supreme judicial court ignored any possible confusion the jury might have had 
about the natures ofthe two convictions. Arguably, however, the problem could have been 
corrected by the trial court's limiting instructions. 
75. The Maguire court's use of these labels without clarifications, however, also in­
troduces the possibility that the defendant will abuse the rule if confronted with a sympa- . 
thetic trial judge. Maguire gives almost absolute power to a trial court to apply its· 
discretion as it wishes, subject only to a deferential appellate review. A balanced applica­
tion of Maguire by a trial judge will ensure that Maguire's goal of fairness to the defendant 
will be preserved. An uneven application of the rule, however, might tend either to allow 
the defendant to cripple the prosecution's cross-examination or to allow the prosecution to 
use questionable convictions (such as the prior conviction in Maguire). The Maguire court 
tried to construct safeguards against abuse by giving appellate review to the defendant and· 
by giving potential limits on the defendant's challenges to admission to the prosecution. 
See supra notes 70 & 71 and accompanying text. The use of checks, however, still depends 
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Other aspects of the opinion make it of limited benefit to a crimi­
nal defendant. First, in a footnote the court stated that if a defendant 
sought to exclude a prior conviction, the judge could condition the 
exclusion on the defendant's agreement not to impeach Common­
wealth witnesses similarly.76 Second, the trial court would not have to 
consider the circumstances of the conviction in its ruling on admissi­
bility,77 although the rule permits such consideration.78 Massachu­
setts courts, however, permit no evidence of circumstances to explain 
the conviction other than what the record contains.79 Both factors, in 
addition to a deferential review by the supreme judicial court, indicate 
a rule that, despite its apparently broad language, will be restrictive in 
application. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Maguire holding can be characterized as the supreme judicial 
court's attempt at a definitive solution to an evidence rule which has 
produced many constitutional challenges and unsettling questions 
about its fairness. so The Maguire rule provides the last assurance 
needed to guarantee a fair application of the rule: discretion provides 
a check on prejudice and appellate review provides a check on the 
abuse of the discretion. Although the rule's language is broader than 
that of most jurisdictions and contains few limits on admissible convic­
tions, the rule in practice promises to be restrictive in other areas. 
Maguire's use in trial and appellate courts will ensure that prior con­
victions will be admitted only when prejudicial questions have been 
eliminated. The prejudice involved, however, will have to be substan­
on the trial court. See Maguire, 392 Mass. at 470-71 & nn.9-lO, 467 N.E.2d at 115-16 & 
nn.9-1O. . 
76. Maguire, 392 Mass. at 470 n.9, 467 N.E.2d at 115 n.9. The court indicated, 
however, that the condition may be limited by constitutional barriers such as the right to 
confrontation of witnesses under the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Id. 
77. Id. at 471 n.lO, 467 N.E.2d at 115-16 n.lO. The defendant in Maguire offered to 
describe the circumstances of the crime, which involved homosexual rather than heterosex­
ual propositions to women who were intended to relay them to football team members. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. See Lamoureux v. N.Y., N. H. & H. R.R., 169 Mass. 338, 340,47 N.E. 1009, 
1010 (1897). 
80. The following cases have dealt with and rejected constitutional challenges to the 
West rule under either the state or federal constitution; Maguire, 392 Mass. 466, 467 
N.E.2d 112; Knight, 392 Mass. 192, 465 N.E.2d 771; King, 391 Mass. 691, 463 N.E.2d 
1168; Diaz, 383 Mass. 73,417 N.E.2d 950; Chase, 372 Mass. 736, 363 N.E.2d 1105; Com­
monwealth v. Dimarzo, 364 Mass. 669, 308 N.E.2d 538 (1974). On the question of unfair­
ness, See Chase, 372 Mass. 736, 363 N.E.2d 1105; DiMarzo, 364 Mass. 669, 308 N.E.2d 
538. 
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tial in order to exclude the convictions, despite the rule's broad 
language. 
Kevin C. McGee 
